Systems and methods for organizing devices in a policy hierarchy

ABSTRACT

In various embodiments, there is provide a method for organizing devices in a policy hierarchy. The method includes creating a first node. The method further includes assigning a first policy to the first node. The method further includes creating a second node, the second node referencing the first node as a parent node such that the second node inherits the first policy of the first node.

CROSS-REFERENCE OF RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.16/820,517, filed on Mar. 16, 2020, which is a continuation of U.S.patent application Ser. No. 15/067,074, filed on Mar. 10, 2016, nowissued as U.S. Pat. No. 10,630,686, which claims priority to, and thebenefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/132,372,titled KO Hierarchy For Key Orchestration System And Process, and filedon Mar. 12, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of,U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,352, titledPolicy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Complex Logical Operations, andfiled on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of,U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,521, titledPolicy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Ephemeral Policies, and filed onFeb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of,U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,670, titledStructure Of Policies For Evaluating Key Attributes Of Encryption Keys,and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference inits entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefitof, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,687, titledLinking Encryption Key Management With Granular Policy, and filed onFeb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in itsentirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of,U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,699 titled SystemAnd Method For Associating Encryption Key Management Policy With DeviceActivity, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein byreference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to,and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No.62/300,717, titled System And Method For Hierarchy Manipulation In AnEncryption Key Management System, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosurerelates to U.S. utility patent application titled System And Method ForEncryption Key Management Federation And Distribution (Ser. No.14/506,346) (attorney ref.: 107283-0203), which is incorporated hereinby reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

In security systems, an encryption key refers to a parameter or datathat dictates how plain data may be translated into encrypted dataduring an encryption process and encrypted data into plain data during adecryption process. Typically, the encryption key is made available bothof a source device (e.g., a transmitting device) and a target device(e.g., a receiving device) in a communication transaction. Given thatencryption keys are so widely used, effective management of theencryption keys (as well as other security objects) to defend andrespond to threats against the security systems is of paramountimportance.

Traditionally, encryption key management is initiated and executed atthe device level (e.g., by the source device and/or the target devicethat are involved in the communication transaction). Communicationmanagement, on the other hand, is traditionally centrally managed at ahigher level (e.g., by a server for the source device and targetdevice). The end result may be that the encryption management isprocedurally unsynchronized with communications management. Thus, loosecontrols of encryption keys, as demonstrated in current public keyinfrastructure (PKI) instances, may result. In addition, loose controlsof symmetric keys generated and distributed in an enterprise may alsooccur. Accordingly, an end result may be a breakdown in communicationmanagement or communication security. Similar problems confront othertypes of encryption objects.

SUMMARY

Embodiments described herein relate to organization of devices of anenterprise, and in particular, organization of the devices in ahierarchical, policy-based structure.

In various embodiments, there is provided a method for organizingdevices in a policy hierarchy, the method including: creating a firstnode, assigning a first policy to the first node, and creating a secondnode, the second node referencing the first node as a parent node suchthat the second node inherits the first policy of the first node.

In some embodiments, the method further includes assigning a secondpolicy to the second node such that the second node is assigned thefirst policy and the second policy.

In some embodiments, the method further including creating a third node,the third node referencing the second node as a parent node such thatthe third node inherits the first policy and the second policy of thesecond node.

In some embodiments, the method further includes registering a firstdevice to the first node such that the first device is bound by thefirst policy of the first node, and registering a second device to thesecond node such that the second device is bound by the first and secondpolicies of the second node.

In some embodiments, the registering the first device includesreferencing an identifier of the first node.

In some embodiments, the method further includes performing an appliedkey management operation including one of key management, keydistribution, or key federation on the second device registered to thesecond node such that the applied key management operation is evaluatedbased on the first and second policies of the second node.

In some embodiments, the method further includes receiving an encryptionkey having a key attribute from the first device, determiningacceptability of the encryption key based on the key attribute and thefirst and second policies of the second device associated with thesecond device, and in response to determining that the encryption key isacceptable, distributing the encryption key to the second device.

In some embodiments, the method further includes creating a thirdpolicy, and assigning the third policy to the second node such that thesecond node is assigned the first policy, the second policy, and thethird policy.

In some embodiments, the method further includes updating the seconddevice to be bound by the first, second, and third policies of thesecond node.

In some embodiments, the assigning includes referencing an identifier ofthe first node.

In various embodiments, there is provided a system for organizingdevices in a policy hierarchy, the system including a memory and aprocessor configured to create a first node, assign a first policy tothe first node, and create a second node, the second node referencingthe first node as a parent node such that the second node inherits thefirst policy of the first node.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to assign asecond policy to the second node such that the second node is assignedthe first policy and the second policy.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to create athird node, the third node referencing the second node as a parent nodesuch that the third node inherits the first policy and the second policyof the second node.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to register afirst device to the first node such that the first device is bound bythe first policy of the first node, and register a second device to thesecond node such that the second device is bound by the first and secondpolicies of the second node.

In some embodiments, the registering the first device includesreferencing an identifier of the first node.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to perform anapplied key management operation including one of key management, keydistribution, or key federation on the second device registered to thesecond node such that the applied key management operation is evaluatedbased on the first and second policies of the second node.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to: receive anencryption key having a key attribute from the first device, determineacceptability of the encryption key based on the key attribute and thefirst and second policies of the second device associated with thesecond device, and in response to determining that the encryption key isacceptable, distribute the encryption key to the second device.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to create athird policy, and assign the third policy to the second node such thatthe second node is assigned the first policy, the second policy, and thethird policy.

In some embodiments, the processor is further configured to update thesecond device to be bound by the first, second, and third policies ofthe second node.

In some embodiments, the assigning includes referencing an identifier ofthe first node.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a generalapplied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of anapplied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of anencryption key federation system as implemented in various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of acommunication device consuming applied key management services accordingto some embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a requestauthentication process for issuing requests and receiving encryptionkeys according to some embodiments.

FIG. 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of acommunication device registration process implemented in various appliedkey management systems according to various embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a keymanagement and distribution process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a keyfederation process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 9 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of anencryption key management and distribution process according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 10A is a diagram illustrating an example of a policy hierarchyaccording to some embodiments.

FIG. 10B is a diagram illustrating an example of a policy hierarchy inan applied key management environment according to various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of organizinga policy hierarchy process according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description of various embodiments, reference is madeto the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof and in which areshown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which theembodiments may be practiced. It is to be understood that otherembodiments may be utilized, and structural changes may be made withoutdeparting from the scope of the various embodiments disclosed in thepresent disclosure.

Embodiments described herein generally relate to security object appliedkey management. The security object applied key management may includemanagement, distribution, and federation of the security object.Security objects may include encryption keys and other sensitive objects(such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates,biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random numbergenerator data, non-determinate random number generator data, userauthentication information, policy components, other componentsassociated with organization security component, and/or the like). Inthe present disclosure, encryption key-based applied key management isdescribed in various embodiments as examples of the security objectapplied key management systems and methods. It should be appreciatedthat the applied key management systems and methods are likewiseapplicable to other security objects, including those described above.

As used herein, “applied key management” may refer to a combination ofkey management, key federation, and key distribution activities in oneor more enterprises. For example, embodiments described may beassociated with the applied key management of encryption key informationcorrelated with utilizing encryption in the one or more enterprises.“Enterprise key management” may include managing and/or overseeing themultiple uses of asymmetric and symmetric keys required for encryptingdata, signing emails, authenticating web services, and/or otherpotential uses. This may also include encryption management forcommunications systems to include radio, cellular, satellite andinternet protocol based communications. “Enterprise key federation” mayinclude coordinating and negotiating the federation of key informationto a plurality of disparate applied key management platforms (eachassociated with disparate federating organizations) based on establishedtrust between the federating organizations (e.g., the enterprises). “Keydistribution” may refer to a centralized distribution (e.g., pushing orforwarding) of key material to support encryption operations within alocal enterprise and/or a foreign enterprise. In particular, keydistribution may be concerned with assigning or otherwise transmittingthe appropriate encryption keys to an appropriately associated device(e.g., the communication device, which may either be a source device ora target device).

Embodiments of applied key management (e.g., an applied key managementdevice such as a management request handler coupled to a request handlerand various supporting databases) may provide control of encryption keymanagement, federation, and distribution through a centralized userinterface. Such applied key management devices may provide centralizedsystems and/or methods of managing encryption keys associated withcommunications, infrastructure, and applications. Such applied keymanagement devices may also manage device enrollment, monitor devicehealth related to encryption capabilities, and monitor status forapplied key management activities. Such capabilities may allow robusttransaction reporting to support audit activities associated withcommunications, application, and infrastructure management.

Applied key management may be leveraged for additional systems otherthan the communication systems. Other implementations of applied keymanagement may include application encryption management, virtualizationencryption management, storage encryption management, and/or useridentity encryption management. In short, if applications,communications, or infrastructures require use of encryption (or othertypes of security mechanisms using security objects) and keys (orsecurity objects), applied key management may be applied to provideadvantages as described. Communication systems may include, but are notlimited to, radio communications, cellular communications, transmissioncontrol protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) based communications,satellite communications equipment, and the like. Application systemsmay include, but are not limited to voice-over-internet protocol VOIPapplications, virtualization, identification and authentication,messaging, local storage. Infrastructure systems may include, but arenot limited to storage solutions, physical security infrastructure, andmedical equipment.

In particular embodiments, an applied key management device may enableencryption key lifecycle activities across multiple types ofcommunication devices in a centralized manner. The applied keymanagement device may leverage industry standards for key management forinteroperability with existing systems and may use, for example,protocols for applied key management as a part of applied keymanagement. A distinction between applied key management and keymanagement alone may be demonstrated in encryption key management andkey distribution for communication systems. Given the requirement tomake new encryption connections before breaking existing connections,typical communication systems cannot utilize rekey commands as it wouldbreak communications before management steps are taken to establish newlines of communications. However, rekey commands may work forinfrastructure—to include storage, applications and virtualizationsolutions—where services can be reestablished without loss ofcentralized control of the managed capability.

The system architecture of applied key management can be configured toallow for use of a standard-based approach for supported systems such askey management interoperability protocol (KMIP), for example, but alsothe capability to develop support interfaces for non-standardizedsystems such as physical security infrastructure, virtualizationapplications, satellite communications systems, and medical equipment.This may be accomplished by architecturally separating message handlingfrom support interfaces. Using a purely KMIP example, a storage devicemay receive a “rekey” command, a communication equipment may receive“put-and-notify” commands, and cellular devices may request queued“notify” commands informing the cellular devices to send “get messages”to the applied key management device to be relayed to key management andgeneration system components. Example systems implementing such featuresare discussed below.

Embodiments described herein may include an applied key managementdevice to implement centralized, top-down enterprise encryption keymanagement encryption keys (e.g., such as, but not limited to symmetrickey encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and the like) as well asother security objects used in security systems. Such centralized,top-down control of encryption may be for a given enterprise.Embodiments may include implementing coordinated KMIP on enterprise keymanagement, communications systems, applications, and infrastructure forencryption key lifecycle functions implementing at least one of: deviceregistration, user registration, system and user initialization, keymaterial installation, key establishment, key registration, operationaluse, key storage, key distribution, key update, key recovery, keyde-registration, key destruction, key revocation, and the like.

As referred to herein, a “key attribute” (attribute, encryptionattribute, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key may referto a characteristic associated with the encryption key, cryptographic orsecurity characteristics of the encryption key, the cryptographicalgorithms of the encryption key, a devicegenerating/transmitting/receiving the encryption key, a user of thedevice, and/or the like. Each encryption key may be associated with atleast one key attribute. The encryption key may be transmitted and/orreceived with its associated key attributes represented in data values.

As referred to herein, a “policy” may be a rule managing an encryptionkey based on key attribute(s) associated with that encryption key. Inparticular embodiments, a policy may dictate whether the particularencryption key is an acceptable encryption key. Such acceptability maybe based on the security and cryptographic considerations as to whetherthe encryption key (e.g., as shown from the key attributes associatedwith the encryption key) may be secure enough. In other words, theencryption key generated for a particular communication transaction maybe presented for inspection by the policy to be evaluated as to whetherthe encryption key is to be allowed or denied for that communicationtransaction.

Some embodiments include an interface for applied key management formobile communication devices (e.g., a wireless device, and/or the like),or provide an interface for applied key management for radio/satellitecommunications systems to include telemetry and payload in satellitecommunications. Particular implementations of the embodiments mayinclude interfaces for banking applications such as, but not limited to,automated teller machines (ATMs), bank account interfaces, and the like.The interfaces for banking applications may be implemented on any mobileor non-mobile devices. Embodiments may provide an interface for appliedkey management for applications that include virtualization or providingan interface for applied key management for network infrastructure toinclude routers, switches, virtual private network (VPN¬) appliances,firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusion preventionsystem (IPSs), tokenizers, and/or the like.

For example, a centralized encryption management may be provided forsymmetric encryption keys or asymmetric encryption keys, in both privateand/or public contexts. In some embodiments, existing networkinfrastructure information may be consumed to distribute encryption keysbased on active/inactive status of network infrastructure ordistributing and managing encryption keys for network infrastructurebased on equipment that can readily accept encryption keys (e.g.,existing hardware/software may be installed on the equipment foraccepting encryption keys).

Embodiments may queue encryption key transaction information forcommunication devices not available at the point of a given encryptionmanagement operation (e.g., in a push-key event). In addition,embodiments described herein may centrally display encryption keylifecycle information (for supported infrastructure) and successfulencryption key management transactions. In addition to or as analternative, failure message and/or a cause of unsuccessful encryptionkey management transactions may be displayed.

In some embodiments, a service interface for a communication device toacquire new asymmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. Inaddition, a service interface for a communication device to acquire newsymmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In some embodiments, aservice interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetrickeys on user initiated basis may be provided. In various embodiments, aservice interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetrickeys on a user initiated basis may be provided. Also, federateddistribution of encryption keys based on established trust based keyexchange between two or more key management and applied key managementdevices may be provided as described.

In some embodiments, distributing federated symmetric key to localenterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federatedsymmetric key distribution may be provided. In various embodiments,distributing federated asymmetric key to local enterprise infrastructurebased on configurations for federated asymmetric key distribution may beprovided. In addition, implementing federated trust model by usingmultiple devices and split key distribution may be provided to establishtrust between two untrusted entities that need to communicate securely.

The applied key management device (e.g., the management request handlerand associated components) may include sub-modules including a businesslogic module, authentication and authorization module, policyenforcement module, system consistency/validation module, and/or thelike for performing functions described herein.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an example of a general applied keymanagement system 100 as implemented in various embodiments. In variousembodiments, an applied key management device 110 may be coupled to atleast one source device 150 a and at least one target device 150 b. Theapplied key management device 110 may include at least one desktopcomputer, mainframe computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phonedevice or the like, configured with hardware and software to performoperations described herein. For example, the applied key managementdevice 110 may include computation systems having suitable processingcapabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input)capabilities, and communication capabilities configured with suitablesoftware to perform operations described herein. Thus, particularembodiments may be implemented, using processor devices that are oftenalready present in many business and organization environments, byconfiguring such devices with suitable software processes describedherein. Accordingly, such embodiments may be implemented with minimaladditional hardware costs. However, other embodiments of the applied keymanagement device 110 may relate to systems and processes that areimplemented with dedicated device hardware/devices specificallyconfigured for performing operations described herein.

Generally, the source device 150 a may be a communication devicetransmitting data (or initiating communication) for which encryption(and therefore an encryption key) may be required or preferred. Thetarget device 150 b may be a communication device for receiving datathat may have been encrypted (e.g., with an encryption key). Accordingto various embodiments, the source device 150 a and/or the target device150 b may be an ATM. The source device 150 a and/or the target device150 b may also be any server or device for storing bank accountinformation and executing banking functions. In particular embodiments,each of the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may includea mobile smart phone (such as, but not limited to an iPhone™, anAndroid™ phone, or the like) or other wireless mobile communicationdevices with suitable processing and encryption capabilities. Typicalmodern mobile communication devices include telephone communicationelectronics as well as some processor electronics, one or more displaydevices and a keypad and/or other user input device. In furtherembodiments, each of the source device 150 a and the target device 150 bmay include any suitable type of mobile phone and/or other type ofportable electronic communication device, such as, but not limited to,an electronic smart pad device (such as, but not limited to an iPad™), aportable computer, or the like. It should be noted that an encryptionkey may originate from either the source device 150 a or the targetdevice 150 b, and/or both. In other words, either of the source device150 a or the target device 150 b may be a key source 170. The sourcedevice 150 a and the target device 150 b may be associated with a sameenterprise or separate enterprises. In other embodiments, one or both ofthe source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may be a wireddevice suitable for communication with a wired or wireless device.

In some embodiments, the applied key management device 110 may be a partof the enterprise associated with the source device 150 a and targetdevice 150 b. An enterprise may be an organization or security unithaving dominance over at least one source device 150 a and/or targetdevice 150 b. With respect to communication between the source device150 a and the target device 150 b associated with disparate enterprises,the source device 150 a may be associated with a first enterprise andthe target device 150 b may be associated with a second disparateenterprise. An enterprise may be a company, subgroup within a company,autonomous and independent entity, a communication group, securityprovider, various entities, organizations, and/or the like. Each appliedkey management device 110 may perform applied key management activitiesfor a plurality of devices such as the source device 150 a and thetarget devices 150 b, establishing a hierarchical model for applied keymanagement.

In other embodiments, the applied key management device 110 may be athird party server coupled to the enterprise associated with the sourcedevice 150 a and/or target device 150 b. Thus, various embodiments mayaffect centralization of applied key management with existingcommunication systems and protocols of the enterprise. In other words,the applied key management device 110 may be implemented to cooperatewith the existing encryption technology for communications,applications, and infrastructure. Applied key management (e.g., by athird party or otherwise) may interact with both the sources and targetsof key information (e.g., the encryption key and the associated keyattributes 160). Accordingly, a top-down control of applied keymanagement may be achieved, while maintaining a request model in whichthe source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may request keyinformation.

In some embodiments, a key source 170 may be coupled to the applied keymanagement device 110. The key source 170 may be any source by which anencryption key (or any other types of security objects) may begenerated. In some embodiments, the key source 170 may be a part of theapplied key management device 110 (e.g., a module or database within theapplied key management device 110 or coupled to the applied keymanagement device 110). In other embodiments, the key source 170 may bea source external to the applied key management device 110. The keysource 170 may include the source device 150 a and/or the target device150 b, one or more of which may be capable of generating encryption keysfor the communication therebetween. Alternatively or additionally, thekey source 170 may be a key-generating device (other than the sourcedevice 150 a and the target device 150 b) internal or external to thesame enterprise as the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150b. In these cases, the key source 170 may be an existing specialized keygenerating device implemented separately from the applied key managementdevice 110 (e.g., the key generation and management device 230 of FIG. 2). Other examples of the key source 170 may include a management userinterface 220 of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys may be generated manuallythrough the management user interface 220), a key federation interface260 of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys generated from a disparateenterprise), various databases storing generated encryption keys, and/orthe like.

In various embodiments, a request 175 may be sent to the applied keymanagement device 110. The request 175 may be a request to generate anencryption key. For example, the applied key management device 110 mayitself generate (or retrieve from a database coupled to the applied keymanagement device 110) encryption keys in response to the request 175.In other examples, the applied key management device 110 may request anencryption key from other devices (e.g., the key source 170) within thesame or a disparate enterprise.

The request 175 may originate from the source device 150 a, the targetdevice 150 b, the applied key management device itself 110, athird-party device within the same enterprise (e.g., the management userinterface 220, the key management interface 240, and the like), athird-party device in a disparate enterprise (e.g., from the keyfederation interface 260 of FIG. 2 ), and/or the like. Embodiments ofthe applied key management device 110 may therefore serve as anintermediary device between the source device 150 a, the target device150 b, the requesting device (which issues the request 175), the keysource 170, and/or the like. Accordingly, key management, distribution,and federation may effectively be managed for various devices in a sameor disparate enterprise.

Various components within the general applied key management system 100(e.g., the applied key management device 110, the source device 150 a,the target device 150 b, the applied key management device itself 110,the device that issues the request 175, the key source 170, and/or thelike) may be connected via any suitable wired or wireless network. Thenetwork may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network may be awide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, theinternet, or one or more intranets, local area networks (LANs), ethernetnetworks, metropolitan area networks (MANs), a wide area network (WAN),combinations thereof, or the like. In particular embodiments, thenetwork may represent one or more secure networks configured withsuitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls,encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibitsaccess to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities.

In some embodiments, key attributes 160 may refer generally tocharacteristics associated with the encryption key itself,characteristics of a device associated with the encryption key, and/orthe like. In other words, the key attributes 160 may refer to when,where, how, for what, with what device the encryption key has been or isabout to be generated. Examples of the key attributes 160 may include,but not limited to, encryption key size, a classification of theencryption key, a time at which the encryption key has been or about tobe generated (e.g., by the key source 170), a location in which theencryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the keysource 170), a role associated with the key source 170, a roleassociated with the source device 150 a, a role associated with thetarget device 150 b, a role associated with a key generating/storagedevice, a role associated with a user of the source device 150 a, thetarget device 150 b, the key generating/storage device, the source 170,a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include the key size.Typically, the larger the key size (i.e., the longer the encryptionkey), the more security it may provide for the communication. The keyattributes 160 may also include the classification of the encryptionkey. In various embodiments, the classification of the encryption keymay refer to its utilization e.g., what the encryption key may be usedfor. Examples of the utilization may include (e.g., for communicationsystems) whether an encryption key is a global hopping key, whether theencryption key is a secret key, whether the encryption key issymmetrical or asymmetrical, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include a time and/orlocation at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated.As described, the time and/or location at which the encryption key maybe generated may be defined from the perspective of the source device150 a, the target device 150 b, and/or any other key sources 170. Forexample, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), acorresponding time of the device (e.g., the key sources 170) generating(and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. Theencryption key may be transmitted/stored with a time stamp representingthe time. Similarly, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent,received), a corresponding geo-location of the device (e.g., the keysources 170) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption keymay be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with thegeo-location.

In various embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include role(s)associated the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the keysource 170, the other key generating/storage device, as well as theirassociated user. Particularly, a role may refer to agroup/classification (e.g., based on predefined assignment, time,geo-location of the device, whether the device is generating encryptionkeys, whether the device is transmitting the encryption key, whether thedevice is receiving the encryption keys, and/or the like) in which thedevice/user is assigned to, a level of security clearance, the type ofthe device/user, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In particularexamples, each device/user may be associated with at least a securitygroup (e.g., assigned to a server). Within each security group,subgroups may exist to further subdivide the devices/users. Thegroups/subgroups may be predetermined by any suitable personnel. Inother or further embodiments, the groups/subgroups may be defined whenthe encryption key is generated (e.g., based on current characteristicsof the device such as geo-location, time of the day, and/or the like).

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that one ormore key attributes 160 may be associated with a given encryption key.In fact, as implemented in various embodiments, an encryption key may beassociated with a plurality of key attributes 160. The encryption keymay be transmitted along with the associated key attributes 160 to adevice (e.g., the applied key management device 110). The encryption keyand the key attributes 160 associated with the encryption key may beinspected according to at least one policy related to the key attributes160. Such process may be referred to as “shooting” the key attributes160 against the relevant policies or “presenting” the key attributes 160for “inspection” by the policy.

The encryption keys may generally be managed by a set of policies 115.As implemented in various embodiments, a policy may refer to at leastone defined rules governing the criteria for the key attributes 160. Insome embodiments, a policy engine (e.g., as embedded in the applied keymanagement device 110 and/or other devices as described herein) mayreceive the encryption key and the key attributes 160 associated withthe encryption key as input. The policy engine may output a response asto whether the encryption key may be allowable based on the keyattributes 160. In particular embodiments, the policy engine may outputa binary response (e.g., accepted or denied).

The encryption key and the associated key attributes 160 may bepresented for inspection one or more times per communicationtransaction. In some embodiments, the encryption key and the associatedkey attributes 160 may only be required to be presented for inspectionby policy 115 once per communication transaction (e.g., at theinitiation stage before the communication transaction has taken placebut after the encryption key has been generated). In other or furtherembodiments, the encryption key and the associated key attributes 160may be required to be presented for inspection by the policies 115periodically and/or every time the encryption key has been altered for agiven communication transaction. In some case several encryption keysmay be presented for inspection by the policies 115 for a givencommunication transaction.

The policy engine may identify the key attributes 160 received. Thepolicy engine may retrieve relevant policy 115 from a local or remotestorage database. In other embodiments, the policy engine may inspectparticular key attributes 160 (or sometimes all key attributes 160)associated with the encryption key as the policy engine determinesacceptability based on the predefined set of policies 115. For example,the policy engine may determine, based on the relevant policy 115,whether the encryption key should be accepted for the communicationtransaction for which the encryption key may be generated.

In one non-limiting example, the policies 115 may dictate that a size ofthe encryption key must be within a predetermined range (e.g., the sizeof the encryption key must exceed and/or be below 128 bits, 192 bits,256 bits, and/or the like). In some cases, the policy 115 may dictatethat the size of the encryption keys must be a particular key size(e.g., 256-bit, and/or the like).

The policies 115 may require that the geo-location attribute of the keyattributes 160 to be associated with (or not associated with) apredetermined location and/or within (or not within) a predeterminedarea. For example, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key(e.g., as defined by the geo-location of the generating, transmitting,and/or receiving device of the encryption key) is associated with a“danger” zone, the policy engine may deny the encryption key. This isbecause there may be a high likelihood that the encryption key may becompromised in the danger zone. On the other hand, when the geo-locationattribute of the encryption key is associated with a “safe” zone, thenthe encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction.This is because there may be at most a low likelihood of includedsecurity keys. In further embodiments, a “neutral” zone may be a safezone, or, in the alternative, a zone associated with an intermediatelikelihood of included security keys.

In another non-limiting example, the policies 115 may require the timeattribute of the key attributes 160 to be within (or not within) apredetermined time period. The policy 115 may deny the encryption key onthe basis that the time attribute (e.g., a time stamp) associated withthe creation, transmission, and/or reception of the encryption key maybe outside of a predetermined time period (for example, at 3:00 am,where acceptable creation, transmission, and/or reception time of theencryption key may be between 9:00 am-5:00 pm).

In various embodiments, the policies 115 may allow the encryption key,when the role attribute of the key attributes 160 is associated with theencryption key generating/transmitting/receiving device (and thedevice's associated user) is within a predetermined accepted group. Insome examples, the source device 150 a (the target device 150 b or othersource devices 170) associated with a first security group within anenterprise may generate an encryption key and present the encryption keyfor inspection by the policy 115. The policy engine may determinewhether the first security group may be a part of the accepted group.When the policy engine determined that the source device 150 a (thetarget device 150 b or other source devices 170) is a part of theaccepted group (e.g., the first security group falls within the acceptedgroup), the encryption key may be allowed for the communicationtransaction for which the encryption has been created for.

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that aplurality of policies 115 may act in concert for a comprehensiveencryption key management scheme. This means that, the plurality ofpolicies 115, each of which may regulate at least one disparate keyattribute 160, may be aggregated into a set of policies 115 forregulating encryption keys presented to the policy engine.

In other examples, other key sources 170 (e.g., other than the sourcedevice 150 a and the target device 150 b) may generate an encryption keyto be distributed (or pushed) to the source device 150 a and/or thetarget device 150 b for a communication transaction between thosedevices. The policy engine (e.g., the applied key management device 110)may inspect the key attributes 160 to determine whether the encryptionkey is allowable. In response to the encryption key being determined tobe allowable, the applied key management device 110 may determine todistribute the encryption key to the source device 150 a and/or thetarget device 150 b for the communication transaction.

In various embodiments, when the policy engine denies the encryptionkey, the policy engine may transmit a rejection indicator (e.g., a“denied” message) to the key source 170. The key generating device mayredesign a second encryption key to be presented (along with the keyattributes 160 associated with the second encryption key) to the policyengine for a second round of inspection. In other embodiments, when thepolicy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmita “denied” message to the key source 170 along with a cause of failure(e.g., a hint) as to which the key attribute 160 caused the denialand/or what it should be.

For example, an encryption key with key attributes 160 including a timeattribute of 4:49 am, geo-location attribute of “safe zone,” and roleattribute of “security group A” may be presented to a set of policies115. The policy engine may allow the encryption key when the encryptionkey is generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m., in either a “safe zone” ora “neutral zone,” and for security groups A-C. Such encryption key maybe denied, given that it is not generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m.The policy engine may transmit the “denied” message along with a timeattribute hint (e.g., to generate the encryption key after 5:00 a.m., in11 minutes).

Accordingly, the applied key management device 110 may be configured tomanage encryption keys and distribute the encryption keys. In otherwords, the applied key management device 110 may serve as anintermediary between the source devices 150 a, the target devices 150 b,other key sources 170, and/or the like as these devices themselves maylack the capability to distribute and manage encryptions in the mannerset forth with respect to the applied key management device 110. Theapplied key management device 110 may include a plurality of modules (ormay be coupled to remote modules) for each feature as described herein.In addition, the general applied key management system 100 may becoupled with at least one other similar general applied key managementsystem 100 to make up the encryption key federation scheme as describedherein.

FIG. 2 is schematic diagram illustrating an example of an applied keymanagement system 200 according to various embodiments. In someembodiments, the applied key management system 200 may illustrate aparticularized implementation of the general applied key managementsystem 100. From an architectural perspective, embodiments asillustrated for the applied key management system 200 may be centeredaround message handling and interoperability with key generationtechnology, other applied key management devices, supportedcommunications systems, applications, and infrastructure.

The applied key management device 110 may include at least a managementrequest handler 205, a request handler 210, a support structure 215 , akey federation interface 260, as well as the associated databases (e.g.,a local key database 270, transactions database 275, policy database280, local user repository 285, configuration database 290, deviceinventory database 295).

In various embodiments, the management request handler 205 may include(or is) the policy engine that may be implemented for policy-basedencryption key management, distribution, and federation. As themanagement request handler 205 can be an intermediary layer between thevarious components described, rapid integration of the policy-basedencryption key management, distribution, and federation may be added toan existing system without having to make changes to the system levelmessage handling. The management request handler 205 may provide atop-down management for various communication devices (e.g., a cellulardevice 250 a, a network device 250 b, . . . , a device N 250 n, and/orthe like) associated with a given enterprise. In various embodiments,each of the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , andthe device N 250 n may be the source device 150 a or the target device150 b depending on the particular communication transaction for whichthe encryption key is generated.

The management request handler 205 and the request handler 210 may be ofan agent-interface relationship. That is, the request handler 210 mayserve as the interface between the management request handler 205 andthe various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g.,the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the deviceN 250 n, and/or the like). The communication between the managementrequest handler 205 and the request handler 210 may be facilitated bythe support structure 215. The support structure 215 may providesuitable communication protocol, management application, infrastructure,communication application program interface (API), configurations,translations, and/or the like for interfacing between the managementrequest handler 205 and the request handler 210.

The request handler 210 may receive key generating requests 175 and/orencryption keys from the various communication devices and relate themto the management request handler 205 with the assistance from thesupport structure 215. The request handler 210 may also relate theresponse of the management request handler 205 (including the hint insome embodiments) and/or encryption keys to the various communicationdevices with the assistance from the support structure 215.

In various embodiments, the management request handler 205 may receivethe request 175 for generating an encryption key. Various components maybe capable of transmitting the request 175 to the management requesthandler 205. The some embodiments, the management request handler 205may receive the request 175 from the various communication devicesassociated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, networkdevice 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, and/or the like). The request 175may be related by the request handler 210, which may serve as theinterface between the devices and the management request handler asdescribed. The key federation interface 260, the management userinterface 220, and the key management interface 240 may also transmitthe request 175 to the management request handler.

In non-request-driven embodiments, the management request handler 205may receive encryption keys from at least one key source 170. The keysource 170 may be the key generation and management device 230, whichmay be any suitable existing encryption key generating apparatusimplemented within the enterprise. In other words, the key generationand management device 230 may represent any existing schemes internal orexternal to the communication systems of the enterprise. For example,the key generation and management device 230 may be any suitable nativeprotocol associated with safe net equipment.

Embodiments of the key management interface 240 may represent aninternal integration of key generation and key management capabilitiesas well as an external interface with existing solutions. This isbecause the key management interface 240 may be poised between the keygeneration and management device 230 (which may generate encryptionkeys) and the management request handler 205 (which inspects keyattributes 160 of the encryption keys based on policies 115). Forexample, the key management interface 240 may be a translation interfacethat maintains a standard encryption management messaging language withthe applied key management device 110. This can allow enterpriseinteroperability between existing solutions (e.g., the key generationand management device 230) and the applied key management platform(e.g., the management request handler 205). Accordingly, thepolicy-based applied key management systems and methods may beimplemented with various types of security object (e.g., encryption key)generation protocols.

Additionally or alternatively, in request-driven embodiments, themanagement user interface 220 may transmit the request 175 to themanagement request handler 210. The management user interface 220 mayutilize the same API as other components described herein to assureinteroperability. The management user interface 220 may include suitableuser input and display devices to receive and display data to adesignated managing user. In particular embodiments, the management userinterface 220 may include a mobile device such as a smartphone or atablet. The management user interface 220 may also include a wireddevice.

In some embodiments, the key federation interface 260 may transmit therequest 175 to the management request handler 205. The key federationinterface 260 may be in communication with a second key federationinterface (such as, but not limited to, the key federation interface260) associated with a disparate enterprise (which may utilize the sameor similar applied key management systems and methods described). Whenone of the various communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, and/or the like) wishescommunicate with another device from the disparate enterprise (or viceversa), the request 175 may be transmitted (from the key federationinterface 260 of the second enterprise) to the key federation interface260 of the current enterprise. In some embodiments, the request 175 maybe directly transmitted to the management request handler 205 when thekey federation interface 260 has designated the relationship between theenterprises to be trusted.

In some embodiments, instead of or in addition to the request 175,encryption keys as well as the “allowed” and “denied” messages may betransmitted and received between the key federation interface 260 (ofthe current and the second enterprise). The encryption key and itsassociated attributes 160 may be stored in the local key database 270,which may be accessible by the management request handler 205 (forpolicy inspection) and/or the request handler 210 (for distribution).

The request 175 may be transmitted with further instructions related togenerating the encryption key. The further instructions include, but arenot limited to, a source of encryption keys, the encryption keysthemselves, key attributes 160 associated with the encryption keys,and/or the like.

In various embodiments, in response to receiving the request 175, themanagement request handler 205 may generate or facilitate the generationof the encryption key. For example, where the request 175 may be silentas to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source170), the management request handler 205 itself may generate theencryption key. The management request handler 205 may generate theencryption key based on the set of policies 115 stored in the policydatabase 280. In other words, the management request handler 205 maygenerate the encryption keys with key attributes 160 that would not haveviolated any policies 115 set forth in the policy database 280.

Where the request 175 may be silent as to where the encryption key is tobe generated (e.g., the key source 170), or specifies that a particularkey source 170 to generate the encryption key, the management requesthandler 205 may retrieve or otherwise request the encryption key from asuitable key source 170. The management request handler 205 may requestencryption keys from the management user interface 220, the keyfederation interface 260, the communication devices (e.g., the cellulardevice 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, sourcedevice 150 a, and target device 150 b), key management interface 240,and/or the like.

The management request handler 205 may retrieve encryption keys from adesignated database storing encryption keys (e.g., the local keydatabase 270). The local key database 270 may be coupled to other keysources 170 (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . .. , device N 250 n, source device 150 a, target device 150 b, the keygeneration and management device 230 the key federation interface 260,and/or the like) and store cached encryption keys on behalf of the otherkey sources 170. The management request handler 205 may retrieveencryption keys from the local key database 270 instead of requestingencryption keys from the key sources 170. This is so that transactiontime for retrieving/generating the encryption key may be improved, andthat network problems would not hinder the ability of the managementrequest handler 205 to obtain encryption keys, given that the local keydatabase may be local to (e.g., residing on a same network node) themanagement request handler 205. As the management request handler 205 isretrieving encryption keys from the local key database 270, averification request may be sent to the key source 170 to ensure whetherthe encryption key to be retrieved has been altered by the key source170. A confirmation or an updated encryption key may be sent to thelocal key database 270 in response, so that the management requesthandler 205 may accordingly receive the encryption key.

In some embodiments, the management request handler 205, upon receivingencryption keys (whether requested or not) in any manner as described,may cache the encryption key along with the key source identifier andthe associated key attributes 160 at the local key database 270. Theencryption key, the key source identifier, and the key attributes 160may be stored in case that the communication is lost or when theencryption key source of the encryption key is not authoritative.Whereas in some embodiments, the encryption key may not be transmittedwith the key attributes 160. In such embodiments, the management requesthandler 205 may determine the key attributes 160 from various sourcessuch as, but not limited to, the local user repository 285, the deviceinventory database 295, and/or the like.

The management request handler 205 may then inspect the key attributes160 associated with the encryption key received based on the set ofpolicies 115 stored in the policy database 280. The management requesthandler 205 may retrieve all policies 115 or only the relevant policies(e.g., based on some or all key attributes 160) from the policy database280. In some embodiments, the encryption keys generated by themanagement request handler 205 or at the direction of the managementrequest handler 205 may be spared from inspection by policies 115 whenthey are created based on the policies 115. In other embodiments, allencryption keys generated by the management request handler 205 or atthe direction of the management request handler 205 may be inspected bythe policies 115. Encryption keys allowable based on the policies 115may be allowed while unacceptable encryption keys may be denied, in themanner described. The management request handler 205 may be configuredto update or add policies stored in the policy database 280 (e.g., asdirected by the management user interface 220).

The local user repository 285 may be a database storing informationrelated to local users of the communication devices (e.g., the cellulardevice 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, and/or thelike) within the enterprise. In various embodiments, the local userrepository 285 may store characteristics/information of the users thatwould constitute key attributes 160. The characteristics include, butnot limited to, privileges, security groups, assigned roles, acombination thereof, and/or the like. The security groups may be storedin a hierarchical tree. The management request handler 205 may accessthe local user repository 285 for such characteristics and utilize themas key attributes 160 associated with encryption keys requested,transmitted, or received by that device corresponding to suchcharacteristics. The management request handler 205 may add or alterinformation stored in the local user repository 285. A copy of theinformation stored in the local user repository 285 may be sent to thelocal key database 270 as key attributes 160 to be stored in the localkey database 270.

In some embodiments, the transaction database 275 may store variouscommunication transactions or potential communication transactions. Insome embodiments, the transaction database 275 may store encryption keytransmission instances (i.e., instances where encryption keys are to bedistributed) to one or more devices. For example, when a particularencryption key cannot/should not be forwarded (e.g., pushed to acommunication device) for any reason, the forwarding transaction (e.g.,a job) may be queued or otherwise stored within the transactionsdatabase 275 for forwarding the encryption key at a later some. Thetransaction database 275 may also store a status of each particularencryption key transmission instance, which may later be read by therequest handler 210. For example, the request handler 210 may at a latertime attempt to transmit all or some encryption keys to correspondingcommunication devices for all “unsent” encryption key transmissioninstances. The transactions database 275 may be coupled to the local keydatabase 270 to gain access of the keys to be forwarded to eachcommunication device that the encryption key may be generated for.

In further embodiments, the transaction database 275 may be coupled tothe request handler 210 and may store the communication transactions(for which the encryption key may be requested, transmitted, orreceived) and/or the associated key attributes 160. For example, therequest handler 210 may transmit such information to the transactionsdatabase 275. The transaction database 275 may be coupled to the localkey database 270. The communication transactions (as the associateddetails) may be associated with the encryption keys stored in the localkey database 270. The management request handler 205 may need to accessonly the local key database 270 for the encryption keys and theassociated key attributes 260.

The configuration database 290 may store supporting instructions for thekey applied key management system 200. In some embodiments, theconfiguration database 290 may store internal network, configuration ofclients, configuration of applications, IP address allocations, variouscomponent configurations, device privileges, device communicationpathways, credentials, and/or the like. The configuration database 290may be coupled to the management request handler 205, which may requirethe instructions stored within the configuration database 290 foroperations. The management request handler 205 may also add or alter theinformation stored in the configuration database 290.

In some embodiments, the device inventory database 295 may storeinformation related to the communication devices associated with thegiven enterprise. For example, information stored may include, but notlimited to, security group, security level, geo-location, identificationnumber, internal classification, device specifications, time stamp inwhich an encryption has been created, a combination thereof, and/or thelike. The request handler 210 may be coupled to the device inventorydatabase 295 to store such data therein. The management request handler205 may be coupled to the device inventory database 295 for accessingsuch device information. The device inventory database 295 forassociating particular cached keys with the corresponding deviceinformation as key attributes 160. A copy of the information stored inthe device inventory database 295 may be sent to the local key database270 as key attributes 160.

The key federation interface 260 may allow one applied key managementdevice 110 to federate encryption key information with one or more otherapplied key management devices 110 (through their associated respectivekey federation interfaces 260) based on an established trustrelationship. Each enterprise may include by an applied key managementdevice 110. As such, the key federation interface 260 may maintain atrust relationship with the communication systems of at least one otherenterprise. It is, in other words, a gateway to extend trust.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of an encryption key federation system 300as implemented in various embodiments. The key federation system 300 mayimplement the applied key management device 110 as set forth withrespect to FIGS. 1-2 . The key federation system 300 may be based onextra-enterprise communication relationship and key federation enabledby the applied key management device 110 (e.g., the management requesthandler 205 and the associated components).

Encryption keys (e.g., asymmetric encryption keys, symmetric encryptionkeys, and/or the like) generated by components within one enterprise(e.g., enterprise A 390 a) may be distributed to a disparate applied keymanagement device (e.g., the applied key management device 110, themanagement request handler 205, and its associated components, and/orthe like) of another enterprise (e.g., enterprise B 390 b) pursuant toinspection by the policies 115 of either (or both) enterprises. This canenable secured communications or data exchange with outside entities(e.g., enterprises) based on the federated trust model. This can alsoallow encryption management to parallel communications management insupporting external communications to enable symmetric key encryptionfor communications. Accordingly, performance of the communicationsplatform may be improved, given that utilization of asymmetricencryption may be expensive from a processing perspective as compared tosymmetric encryption.

In the key federation system 300, each enterprise (e.g., the enterpriseA 390 a or the enterprise B 390 b) may be associated with a respectiveone of an applied key management device A 310 a and an applied keymanagement device B 310 b). Each of the applied key management device A310 a and the applied key management device B 310 b may be the appliedkey management device 110. The applied key management device A 310 a andthe applied key management device B 310 b may be in communication withone another through any suitable network. In particular, the keyfederation interfaces (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of eachof the applied key management device A 310 a and the applied keymanagement device B 310 b may be in communication with one another.

In various embodiments, the key management server A 330 a and the keymanagement server B 330 b may be a device such as, but not limited to,the key generation and management device 230 and the key managementinterface 240. Each of the key management server A 330 a and the keymanagement server B 330 b may be coupled to their respective keyfederation interfaces 206 within their respective enterprises in themanner described.

A device A 350 a and a device B 350 b may attempt to obtain anencryption key for the communication therebetween. Each of the device A350 a and the device B 350 b may be the source device 150 a, the targetdevice 150 b, the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . ., the device N 250 n, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

An encryption key may be generated within one enterprise (e.g.,enterprise A 390 a) from any suitable key source 170 in the mannerdescribed. The encryption key may be generated by the enterprise A 390 a(e.g., by a key source 170 in the enterprise A 390 a) with or without arequest 170 from either enterprise B 390 b or within enterprise A. Theencryption key may likewise be generated by the enterprise B 390 b in asimilar manner. The encryption key and its associated key attributes 160may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise A 390 a (e.g., theapplied key management device A 310 a, which may include the managementrequest handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in themanner described. In response to the policy engine of enterprise A 390 adetermining the encryption key is accepted based on the encryption keyattributes 160, the applied key management device 310 a (e.g., the keyfederation interface 260) of enterprise A 390 a may relate theencryption key as well as its associated key attributes 160 to theapplied key management device B 310 b (e.g., the key federationinterface 260) of enterprise B 390 b.

Upon receiving the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160,the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 may bepresented to the policy engine of enterprise B390 b (e.g., the appliedkey management device B 310 b, which may also include the managementrequest handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in themanner described. The encryption key may be forwarded to both the deviceA 350 a and the device B 350 b when the applied key management device B310 b determines that the encryption key is consistent with its policies115 defined for enterprise B 390 b. In other words, the encryption key(as defined by its key attributes 160) may be allowed only if it isconsistent with both sets of policies 115 of enterprise A 390 a as wellas enterprise B 390 b. At least some of the set of policies 115 ofenterprise A 390 a may be different from at least some of the set ofpolicies 115 of enterprise B 390 b. Whereas the encryption key is foundnot allowable by either the applied key management device A 310 a or theapplied key management device b 310 b, the encryption key may bereturned back to the key source 170 with the “denied” message and/or thehint in the manner described.

In other embodiments, acceptance by policies 115 associated with onlyone enterprise (e.g., either enterprise A 390 a or enterprise B 390 b)may be sufficient for encryption key to be allowed. In such cases, thetrust extends to some or sometimes all of the policies 115. In addition,each enterprise may include a set of policies 115 for the federatedinstances (e.g., each enterprise may have agreed with the otherregarding a set of policies 115 used when communications between thecommunication devices of the enterprises are to occur. Accordingly, eachenterprise may store (e.g., in each respective policy database 280) asame set of federated (mutual and reciprocal) policies for the federatedschemes. The federated policies may be the same for both the enterpriseA 390 a and the enterprise B 390 b. Thus, allowance by one applied keymanagement device associated with one enterprise may be sufficient forthe encryption key to be forwarded for usage for communication betweenboth enterprises.

In various embodiments, enterprise federation policies may be storedwithin each policy database 280. The enterprise federation policies mayspecify the manner in which the encryption keys may be federated. Forexample, the enterprise federation policies may specify the federatedpolicies, which applied key management device may inspect the keyattributes 160, which enterprise may issue a request 175 for anencryption key, which enterprise may generate an encryption key, acombination thereof, and/or the like. The enterprise federation policiesallow flexibility in policy defining. For example, the enterprisefederation policies may specify that enterprises may each include itsown policies 115 in addition to the federated policies, where at least apart the policies 115 of each enterprise may be disparate.

In some embodiments, a communication platform A 320 a and acommunication platform B 320 b of each respective enterprise may be incommunication with one another via any suitable network. Suchcommunication between the communication platforms may be encryptedcommunications, where the encryption key corresponding to suchcommunication may also be presented for inspection by policies 115similar to described with respect to the devices (e.g., the device A 350a, the device B 350 b, and/or the like). Each communication platform maybe in communication to a respective device, such that configurationsrelated to the applied key management systems may be exchanged.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a communication device 400 consumingapplied key management services as part of the enterprise according tosome embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-4 , the communication device 400may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device 150 a,the target device 150 b, the cellular device 250 a, the network device250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, the device A 350 a, the device B 350b, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In some embodiments, thecommunication device 400 leverages applied key management to receiveencryption keys (or key updates) associated with applications such as,but not limited to, an Email application 410 a, voice-over-internetprotocol (VOIP) application 410 b, storage encryption 410 c, and/orother encryption applications 410 d on the communication device 400.

The communication device 400 may be registered with an applied keymanagement platform to receive applied key management services. Thecommunication device 400 may provide an application interface 420 basedconfigured to receive with encryption key distribution and encryptionkey management messages (e.g., the “allowed” message, the “denied”message, the hint, and/or the like) from the applied key managementdevice 110. The application interface 420 may be coupled to each of theEmail application 410 a, voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application410 b, storage encryption 410 c, and/or other encryption applications410 d to forward the accepted encryption key to them.

This communication device 400 may also utilize KMIP by a KMIP proxy 430to receive KMIP type commands from the applied key management device110. The KMIP proxy 430 may be connected to the key store 440 formanaging the encryption keys stored therein. The KMIP proxy 430 may alsobe connected to a device-end cryptographic unit 450. The device-endcryptographic unit 450 may be configured to generate encryption keys. Inresponse to the “denied” message, the device-end cryptographic unit 450may generated a different encryption key to present to the policy enginefor inspection. Whereas the hint is given, the device-end cryptographicunit 450 may generate a different encryption key based on the hint. Thedevice-end cryptographic unit 450 may cache its encryption keys in thekey store 440. The device-end cryptographic unit 450 may be coupled tothe application interface 420. The application interface 420 maytransmit the encryption keys generated along with the key attributes 160to the policy engine and forward the response of the policy engine tothe device-end cryptographic unit 450 e.g., when the response isnegative.

Accordingly, operation-level policy inspection may be achieved. Giventhat the communication device 400 may be capable to interact with thepolicy engine regarding the encryption keys, the ability to service therequest for an encryption key (or inspect the encryption key) by athird-party device (e.g., the policy engine residing in the applied keymanagement device 110) acting as administrating may be achieved. Therequest 175 for an encryption key or the encryption key may be servicedeach communication transaction.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a request authentication process 500for issuing requests 175 for encryption keys in various applied keymanagement systems according to some embodiments. The requestauthentication process 500 may be internal to the applied key managementdevice 110, when the applied key management device 110 (e.g., themanagement request handler 205, the applied key management device A 310a, the applied key management device B 310 b, and/or the like) itselfgenerates the encryption keys. In other embodiments, the requestauthentication process 500 may be external to the applied key managementdevice 110 to support integration with existing key management and keygeneration infrastructure (e.g., the key generation and managementdevice 230, the key management server A 330 a, the key management serverB 330 b, and/or the like).

First, at block B510, the applied key management device 110 may provideauthentication information to a key source 170. As described, such keysource 170 may be the applied key management device 110 itself, the keygeneration and management device 230, the management user interface 220,the key federation interface 260, the communication devices (e.g., thecellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n,source device 150 a, target device 150 b, device A 350 a, device B 350b, communication device 400, a combination thereof, and/or the like),and/or other external key sources. The authentication information may beany suitable authentication method, such as username/passcode request,security handshake algorithms, biometric request, a combination thereof,and/or the like.

Next, at block B520, the applied key management device 110 may receiveauthentication response from the key source 170. The applied keymanagement device 110 may authenticate the response and establishtrusted relationship between the key source 170 and the applied keymanagement device 110. Next at block B530, the applied key managementdevice 110, the management user interface 220, the key generation andmanagement device 230, the communication devices, and other API callsmay issue a key management/generation request (e.g., the request 175) tothe key source 170. In some embodiments, the applied key managementdevice 110 may forward the request 175 from a trusted third party (e.g.,the communication devices, the management user interface 220, the keyfederation interface 260, and/or other third-party devices) to the keysource 170. In some embodiments, the request 175 may be directly sent tothe key source 170. The applied key management device 110 may beconfigured to determine whether to generate encryption keys itself orforward the request to another key source 170 when the request 175 doesnot identify the key source 170. Next, at block B540, the applied keymanagement device 110 may receive response (e.g., the encryption keys asrequested) from the key source 170.

Subsequently, the encryption keys obtained by the applied key managementdevice 110 may be evaluated based on the key attributes 160 and thepolicies 115 in the manner described. When allowed, the encryption keysmay be distributed to the communication devices associated with thecorresponding communication transaction. When denied, the applied keymanagement device 110 may transmit the “denied” message (and in someinstances, the hint) and standby for new encryption keys.

In some embodiments, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of keysources 170, each request may correspond to a single communicationtransaction. In response, the multiple responses (e.g., encryption keys)may be received from the key sources 170. In other embodiments, multiplerequests may be sent to a plurality of key sources 170, where two ormore requests may correspond to a same communication transaction. As theapplied key management device 110 may receive two or more encryptionkeys from the key sources 170. The applied key management device 110 maydetermine one of the two or more encryption keys for the communicationtransaction based on the policies 115 (e.g., the most secure out of thetwo or more encryption keys).

Accordingly, large scale distribution by the applied key managementdevice 110 may be possible in systems including at least one source forthe encryption keys and multiple recipient communication devices.

FIG. 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of acommunication device registration process 600 implemented in variousapplied key management systems according to various embodiments. BlocksB610, B620, B630 may be executed simultaneously or sequentially in thatorder. First, at block B610 the communication device may be discovered(e.g., by the request handler 210). The request handler 210 may detectthat the communication device is present within the enterprise (e.g.,the networks associated with the enterprise) automatically.

At block B620, the communication device may be registered (e.g., by therequest handler 210). In some embodiments, configuration informationrelated to the applied key management systems may be transmitted to thecommunication device. Device information of the communication device maybe transmitted to the local user repository 285, device inventorydatabase 295, and/or the like. At block B630, the communication devicemay be enrolled (e.g., by the request handler 210). For example, thecommunication device may transmit a server authentication request therequest handler 210 and receiving a positive authorization response.

Next, at block B640, the communication device may be accepted (e.g., bythe request handler 210). For example, the request handler 210 and/orthe management request handler 205 may check existing policies 115 basedon the device information to determine whether the communication devicehas been classified in the appropriate group, whether the applied keymanagement device 110 may be capable of managing the communicationdevice, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block B650, the request handler 210 may provide deviceauthentication information to the communication device. Theauthentication information may include configurations (e.g.,credentials, passcodes, and/or the like) to access the applied keymanagement device 110. Next, at block B660, the request handler 210and/or the management request handler 205 may define applied keymanagement rules for the communication device. Following block B660 atblock B670 a corresponding identifier, the commination device has beenadded to an applied key management registration. Subsequently, thecommunication device may request for encryption keys, generateencryption keys, receive approved encryption keys, and/or the like inthe manner described. Such process ensures that the communication deviceutilizing services provided by the applied key management device 110 maymeet the operable standards of the applied key management device 110.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a key management and distributionprocess 700 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-7 ,the key management and distribution process 700 may be implemented withcommunication devices registered, discovered, and/or enrolled with theapplied key management device 110.

First, at block B710, the management request handler 205 may define keymanagement command. A key management command may be a particularizedcommand for a key management event (e.g., “job”). The key managementevent may be an event triggering a set of algorithms to createencryption keys based on the policies 115 and distribute (e.g., push)the encryption keys to at least one of the communication devices (e.g.,the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n,source device 150 a, target device 150 b, device A 350 a, device B 350b, communication device 400, a combination thereof, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, the key management event may be based on time. Forexample, the management request handler 205 may be configured to rekeyfor at least some (sometimes all) of the communication devicesassociated with the enterprise (or another enterprise) periodically(e.g., every day, every week, every month, and/or the like). In variousembodiments, the key management event may occur automatically through anAPI call. The API call may be issued from any components internal and/orexternal to the applied key management device 110 within a same ordisparate enterprise.

The key management event may also be user-defined. For example, themanagement user interface 220 may receive user input from the designateduser to generate encryption keys immediately for at least onecommunication device. In such examples, such user-defined key managementevents may be initiated in response to a sudden event, includingcyber-attacks, security breaches, change to the polices 115, and/or thelike. The management user interface 220 may also alter the policies 115stored within the policy database 280 in response to these keymanagement events. The new encryption keys created must follow thealtered set of policies 115.

The key management command may include providing encryption key to someor all communication devices within the same or a disparate enterprise,re-transmitting a same or different encryption key to some or allcommunication devices within the same or disparate enterprise, acombination thereof, and/or the like. In various embodiments, themanagement request handler 205 may define for a plurality of keymanagement commands, each of which may correspond to a communicationtransaction and/or communication device associated with the enterprise.In further embodiments, the management request handler 205 may definekey management commands for communication devices associated with adisparate enterprise when allowed by the federation model. Themanagement commands (e.g., encryption keys) may be transmitted via thekey federation interfaces 260 associated with each enterprise.

Next, at block B720, the management request handler 205 may build a keymanagement command queue. A job created in response to the keymanagement event may include a plurality of key management commands,each of which may correspond to a communication device and/or acommunication transaction. Accordingly, where the key managementcommands are generating new encryption keys and distributing to two ormore communication devices, the key management commands may be queued(e.g., stored within the transactions database 275) for execution, giventhe volume of the key management commands. As such, a composite commandmay correspond to key management commands for multiple key sources toissue encryption keys to multiple encryption key receiving communicationdevices. The composite command may be associated with a plurality of keymanagement commands, and may be stored as a whole in the transactiondatabase 275 awaiting distribution. Thus, even if a server (e.g., themanagement request handler 205) is shut off before all the keymanagement commands are executed/distributed, the process may resume assoon as the sever is switched on.

Key management command associated with inactive communication devices(e.g., communication devices that may be turned off and/or off thenetwork) may be stored in the transactions database 275 for futuredistribution (e.g., when the inactive communication devices are switchedon) by the management request handler 205 at block B730. On the otherhand, for active devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turnedon and/or on the network), the key management command may be executed bythe management request handler 205 at block B740.

For example, the management request handler 205 may request encryptionkeys from key sources 170 based on the key management commands at blockB750. For example, the key management commands may specify one or morekey sources 170 to issue encryption keys to the communication devices.Accordingly, some communication devices may receive encryption keys froma first key source while other communication devise may receiveencryption keys from a second different key source. Next, at block B760,the management request handler 205 may distribute encryption keys to thecommunication devices. In some embodiments, the management requesthandler 205 may perform encryption key inspection based on the keyattributes 160 and the set of policies 115 in the manner described. Onceapproved, the management request handler 205 may forward the encryptionkeys to the corresponding communication devices through the requesthandler 210.

Next, at block B770, the management request handler 205 may receiveresponse to the distribution from the communication devices. Forexample, the management request handler 205 may determine, based on theresponses of the communication devices, whether such distribution wassuccessful at block B780. Whereas the management request handler 205determines that the distribution was successful with respect to a givencommunication device (e.g., that communication device has received theencryption key distributed to it), positive feedback may be provided tothe management request handler 205 at block B795.

On the other hand, whereas the management request handler 205 determinesthat the distribution was unsuccessful (e.g., that communication devicehas not received the encryption key distributed to it) for a givencommunication device, a negative response of that communication devicemay be provided to the management request handler 205 at block B790. Themanagement request handler 205 may then determine whether to attempt toexecute the key management command again at a later time for thatcommunication device based on preexisting algorithms or user input atblock B798.

When management request handler 205 determines that execution of the keymanagement commands (e.g., the distribution of the encryption) is not tobe attempted again (B798:NO), the process ends. On the other hand,whereas the management request handler 205 determines that keymanagement commands not successfully distributed are to be attemptedagain (B798:YES), the key management commands may be stored at blockB730 (e.g., in the transactions database 275) for future distribution.

In some embodiments, when distribution of the key management commandsmay be unsuccessful, the management request handler 205 may determine toretry distribution of the unsuccessful key management commands(B780:RETRY). For example, the management request handler 205 may againexecute key management commands for active devices at block B740.

FIG. 8 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of anencryption key federation process 800 according to various embodiments.Referring to FIGS. 1-8 , applied key management devices 110 (e.g., bothin a same local enterprise and in a foreign enterprise) may mutuallyauthenticate and distribute encryption keys based on the policies 115implemented for applied key management devices 110 or each enterprisefor federating encryption keys from one enterprise to anotherenterprise. In addition, the encryption key federation process 800 mayalso include the receiving of encryption keys from a foreign applied keymanagement device as a result of the federation policy of the foreignapplied key management device.

First, at block B810, the local applied key management device (e.g., theapplied key management device A 310 a) may provide authenticationinformation to a foreign applied key management device (e.g., theapplied key management device B 310 b). The authentication informationmay be any suitable authentication prompt and/or request for federation.Next, at block B820, the local applied key management device may receiveauthentication response from the foreign applied key management deviceagreeing to initiation the federation model. The blocks B810 and B820may represent typical security credential handshakes, where federationtrust has been established between the two enterprises.

Next, at block B830, the local applied key management device may providetrust policy information to the foreign applied key management device.At block B840, the local applied key management device may receive trustpolicy information from the foreign applied key management device. Thetrust policy information may include any configurations, settings,extent of trust, mutually agreed policies, a combination thereof, and/orthe like.

Next, at block B850, the local applied key management device and theforeign applied key management device may manage and distribute keyinformation (e.g., the encryption key, the associated key attributes160, a combination thereof, and/or the like) in the manner described.

In particular embodiments, the foreign applied key management devicetransmit the request 175 to the local applied key management device forgenerating the encryption key for a communication transaction between acommunication device associated with the foreign applied key managementdevice and a communication device associated with the local applied keymanagement device. The encryption key may be generated by the localapplied key management device and inspected by local policy engine. Theencryption key may be transmitted to the foreign applied key managementdevice for inspection by the foreign policy engine in some embodiments,but not others.

In some embodiments, instead of the request 175, the foreign applied keymanagement device may transmit a generated encryption key (which may ormay not have been inspected by policy engine of the foreign applied keymanagement device depending on trust policy information specified). Thelocal applied key management device may or may not inspect theencryption key and its associated key attributes 160 by policies 115based on the trust policy information specified between the enterprises.

FIG. 9 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of anencryption key management and distribution process 900 according tovarious embodiments. In various embodiments, the encryption keymanagement and distribution process 900 may incorporate elements ofapplied key management, including key management, key distribution, andkey federation.

First, at block B910, a set of policies 115 may be defined, where eachpolicy 115 may relate to one or more key attributes 160. The policies115 may be defined by designed personnel and stored in the policydatabase 280 for future retrieval and update. Next, at block B920, themanagement request handler 205 may receive encryption key and at leastone key attribute associated with the encryption key from the key source170 in the manner described.

Next, at block B930, the management request handler 205 may determineacceptability of the encryption key received based, at least in part, onthe at least one key attribute and the set of policies 115 that relateto one of the at least one key attribute. For example, the managementrequest handler 205 may check a value corresponding to a key attribute160 to determine whether the value is within an acceptable range asdefined by the policies 115 in the manner described.

Next, at block B940, the management request handler 205 may determinewhether the encryption key is acceptable. Whereas the encryption key isacceptable (B940:YES), the management request handler 205 may distributethe encryption key to the communication devices requiring the key forthe communication transaction therebetween, at block B950. On the otherhand, whereas the encryption key is unacceptable (B940:NO), themanagement request handler 205 may transmit the “denied” message to thekey source 170 at block B960. Optionally, the management request handler205 may transmit the hint to the key source to facilitate key generationat block B970. The management request handler 205 may then standby untilreceiving a second encryption key (and associated key attributes 160) atblock B920.

The applied key management system (e.g., the applied key managementdevice 110, the management request handler 205, applied key managementdevice A 310 a, applied key management device B 310 b, and/or the like)described herein may be implemented on any suitable computing deviceshaving a processor and a memory device. The processor may include anysuitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor(e.g., a microprocessor), but in the alternative, the processor may beany conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or statemachine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination ofcomputing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, aplurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunctionwith a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The memory may beoperatively coupled to the processor and may include any suitable devicefor storing software and data for controlling and use by the processorto perform operations and functions described herein, including, but notlimited to, random access memory RAM, read only memory ROM, floppydisks, hard disks, dongles or other RSB connected memory devices, or thelike.

The applied key management device 110, the management request handler205, applied key management device A 310 a, and/or applied keymanagement device B 310 b may be implemented on suitable operatingsystems (OS) such as, but not limited to, the Linux OS, Windows, the MacOS, and the like. Additionally, the applied key management device 110,the management request handler 205, applied key management device A 310a, and/or applied key management device B 310 b may be implemented onsmall form factors such as embedded systems.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may be organized in a hierarchicalstructure for a structured organization of the policies 115. Astructured organization may be a well-known, documented, and understoodorganization structure. For example, the policies 115 may be organizedin a Directed Acyclic Graph in some embodiments. The Directed AcyclicGraph may be a hierarchical graph having nodes (vertices) and directededges. The directed edges may indicate an order or hierarchy in whichthe nodes are organized. In other embodiments, the policies 115 may beorganized in other suitable hierarchical structures such as, but notlimited to, a tree. Each node of the Directed Acyclic Graph or tree maybe associated with a particular hierarchical entity of the structuredorganization. Each node may represent a conceptual level, subdivision,department, collection of clients, and/or the like of a structuredorganization of a company or other organization. For example, a policyhierarchy may correspond to an overall structure of a company, and afirst node may represent a department (e.g., an accounting department)of the company and a second node may represent another department (e.g.,an engineering department) of the same company. In other embodiments, anode may be associated with particular devices to be associated with thenode. For example, a first node may be associated with source devices150 a and a second node may be associated with target or destinationdevices 150 b.

FIG. 10A is a diagram illustrating an example of a policy hierarchy 1000according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-10 , the policyhierarchy 1000 may be a Directed Acyclic Graph having a root node 1010,Node A 1020, Node B 1030, and Node C 1040. A node (e.g., the root node1010, Node A 1020, Node B 1030, or Node C 1040) may be associated withone or more devices such as, but not limited to, the source device 150a, the target device 150 b, cellular device 250 a, the network device250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, and/or the like. In some embodiments,a node may be associated with one or more devices such as, but notlimited to, the key source 170, key generation and management device230, and/or the like.

In addition or alternatively, each node may be associated with at leastone policy 115 such as, but not limited to, the complex policies EQUAL,ONE-OF, MEMBER OF, NULL, NOT-NULL, GREATER-THAN,GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, LESS-THAN, LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, and/or thelike described herein. Accordingly, each device associated with a givennode may also be associated with the policies 115 corresponding to thatnode.

In some embodiments, child nodes may inherit the policies 115 of parentnode(s) based on parentage set forth in the policy hierarchy 1000. Forexample, the root node 1010 may be a parent node to Node A 1020 and NodeC 1040. Node A 1020 and Node C 1040 may be child nodes to the root node1010. Node A 1020 may be a parent node to Node B 1030. Node B 1030 maybe a child node to Node A 1020. In some embodiments, policies 115associated with the root node 1010 may also be associated with devicescorresponding with Node A 1020 and Node C 1040 through inheritance. Insome embodiments, policies 115 associated with Node A 1020 may beassociated with devices corresponding to Node B 1030. In someembodiments, policies 115 associated with the root node 1010 may beassociated with devices corresponding to Node B 1030, throughinheritance. In some embodiments, a child node in the policy hierarchy1000 has only one direct parent node.

In some embodiments, the policy hierarchy 1000 may further include NodeD 1050 and Node E 1060, which may be child nodes of Node C 1040. Becausethey are child nodes of Node C 1040, Node D 1050 and Node E 1060 mayalso inherit the policies of Node C 1040, which in turn inherited thepolicies of the Root Node 1010. Accordingly, the policy hierarchy 1000may be segmented into levels, with Level 0 including the Root Node 1010,Level 1 including Node A 1020 and Node C 1040 (child nodes of Root Node1010), Level 2 including Node B 1030 (child node of Node A 1020), Node D1050 and Node E 1060 (child nodes of Node C 1040). In variousembodiments, any suitable number of levels including parent and childnodes may be implemented as desired by an administrator (e.g., 50 levelsof nodes with numerous nodes positioned at each level).

In some embodiments, the policy defined at the Level 0 Root Node 1010 isinherited by all other nodes in the policy hierarchy 1000 (e.g., node atlevel 1, level 2, and so on). As such, the Root Node 1010 allows fordefining global devices and global policy that can be consumed for asingle enterprise or in a multi-tenancy model where applied keymanagement functions are consumed.

In some embodiments, while policy inheritance in the policy hierarchy1000 provides a top to bottom scheme (e.g., policies are inherited bychild nodes from parent nodes), visibility of devices in the policyhierarchy 1000 exhibit a bottom to top design. In other words, childnodes may have visibility of all devices associated with their parentnodes. In some embodiments, visibility refers to a device'saccessibility to another device, such as via communication with theother device. For example, a device associated with Node B 1030 may be atarget device 150 b and a device associated with Node A 1020 may be asource device 150 a, and the source device 150 a may be said to bevisible to the target device 150 b. In some embodiments, in practice,devices associated with the Root Node 1010 may be visible to all otherdevices in the policy hierarchy 1000. As another example, the devicesassociated with Node A 1020 may be visible to the devices associatedwith Node B 1030. In some embodiments, devices associated with separatenodes at the same level in the policy hierarchy 1000 do not havevisibility with each other. For example, devices associated with Node A1020 may not have visibility with devices associated with Node C 1040.Similarly, in some embodiments, Node A 1020 and Node C 1040 do notinherit policies from one another, as the policies of Node A 1020 andNode C 1040 are separately inherited from the Root Node 1010. In someembodiments, the devices associated with a parent node are visible toeach of the parent node's child node devices. However, in someembodiments, the devices associated with the child nodes are not visibleto devices of the parent node.

In some embodiments, the organization of the policy hierarchy 1000 andthe nodes that make up the policy hierarchy 1000 are created by andstored in the encryption applied key management system 200. In someembodiments, a user at the management user interface 220 can create,assign, and modify the nodes in the policy hierarchy 1000. Furthermore,the user can assign, create, and modify policies to be associated withone or more of the nodes. In some embodiments, the user can assign orregister devices 250 to a node in the policy hierarchy 1000.Accordingly, a device 250 that is assigned to a node may be bound by thepolicies associated with the assigned node. In some embodiments, aplurality of device may be assigned to a node. In some embodiments, nodevices are assigned to a node.

In some embodiments, the framework of the nodes and the associatedpolicies and devices of each of the nodes are stored within a databaseof the encryption applied key management system 200, such as, but notlimited to, one or more of databases 270, 275, 280, 285, 290, and 295.In other embodiments, the encryption applied key management system 200includes a policy hierarchy database for storing the policy hierarchydata, such as, but not limited to, position of nodes within thehierarchy (e.g., levels), what node individual devices are assigned to,what policies are associated with respective nodes, and/or the like. Insome embodiments, the policy hierarchy database accesses other databasesin the encryption applied key management system 200 for relevant data.For example, the policy hierarchy database may access the policydatabase 280 and device inventory database in assigning and associatingthe policies and the devices with the nodes.

In some embodiments, each of the nodes in the policy hierarchy 1000 isassigned a unique identifier, such as, but not limited to, a universallyunique identifier (UUID). The data corresponding to the nodes and theunique identifier may be stored in a policy hierarchy database in theencryption applied key management system 200. Similarly, devices to beassociated with nodes and policies to be associated with nodes may eachalso be assigned a unique identifier. Accordingly, for associating nodeswith policies and devices, the policies and devices may reference theunique identifier of the assigned node. In other embodiments, the nodesreference the unique identifiers of the policies and/or the devices forassociation. In various embodiments, the data including the identifiersand referencing information of the nodes, policies, or devices arestored in a database in the encryption applied key management system 200(e.g., in a policy hierarchy database) for access. In some embodiments,the unique identifiers and the referencing data of the nodes, policies,or devices are stored as any suitable data structure, such as, but notlimited to, a data table.

In some embodiments, a user may create and define policies associatedwith various nodes (e.g., a user at the management user interface 220).In creating a node and policies associated therewith, a user maydesignate various attributes associated with the new node, such as, butnot limited to, a level at which the new node will be inserted, a parentnode of the new node (e.g., by referencing an identifier associated withthe parent node), devices to be registered with the node, policies to beassociated with the new node, and/or the like. The newly created nodemay be stored in a database (e.g., policy database 280). Moreover, theuser may register devices to be incorporated into the policy hierarchy1000 by associating the devices with a particular node (e.g., byreferencing an ID of a particular node). For example, a device (e.g., asource device 150 a or a target device 150 b) may be registered byreferencing a node that the device is to be associated with, such thatthe device can follow the policies associated with the associated node.In some embodiments, registered devices are associated with a node ofthe policy hierarchy 1000 as part of a registration process of thedevices. On the other hand, in some embodiments, a node may beestablished without associating any devices or policy with the node. Inother embodiments, a created node may have one or more destination ortarget devices 150 b or one or more source devices 150 a associated withthe node.

In some embodiments, a child node may be associated with a parent node,and the child node may inherit the policies of the parent node. In suchembodiments, the policies of the parent node may be modified (e.g., apolicy may be added to the parent node or deleted from the parent node).In some embodiments, the newly updated policies of the parent node willpercolate down to the child node, and the policies of the child nodewill be updated accordingly. For example, Node A 1020 may be associatedwith a first policy and a second policy, which are inherited by Node B1030. An administrator may disassociate the second policy from Node A1020, and thus the disassociation of the second policy from Node B 1030may also occur through inheritance. Accordingly, active inheritance maybe exhibited by the nodes in the policy hierarchy 1000, in which nodesmay continuously update their policies based on changes to policies withrespect to parent nodes.

In some embodiments, associated devices may also update the policiesassociated with them based on updated policies at nodes to which thedevices are assigned. For example, if the second policy is disassociatedfrom Node B 1030, the second policy may also be disassociated from allof the devices assigned to Node B 1030, and therefore applied keymanagement functions performed with respect to one or more of thedevices associated with Node B 1030 may no longer be evaluated againstthe second policy.

FIG. 10B is a diagram illustrating an example of the policy hierarchy1000 in an applied key management environment according to variousembodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-10B, the Root Node 1010 may beassociated with one or more policies, Node A may be associated with thepolicies inherited from the Root node 1010 and other additionalpolicies, and Node B 1030 may be associated with the policies inheritedfrom Node A 1020. Moreover, one or more source devices (e.g., sourcedevice 150 a) may be associated with Node A 1020, and one or moredestination devices (e.g., target device 150 b) may be associated withNode B 1030. By way of example, the source devices associated with NodeA 1020 may be a hardware security module, a key management device, orother encryption key sources, and the destination devices associatedwith Node B 1030 may be computers, communication device, or other userapplication infrastructure.

In some embodiments, the hierarchical structure 1000 illustrated in FIG.10B provides organization for facilitating the various applied keymanagement services, including key management, key distribution, and keyfederation. An applied key management job may be performed with respectto a destination device associated with Node B 1030 or a plurality ofdestination devices associated with node B 1030. As such, an applied keymanagement job may be targeted against a node of the policy hierarchy1000 (e.g., Node B 1030). Accordingly, as an example, an applied keymanagement job targeting Node B 1030 can use key sources from Node A1020, in conjunction with the policies inherited and/or added to theNode B 1030. In some embodiments, an applied key management job (e.g.,key distribution, key federation, or key management) targeting Node B1030 may target an individual device associated with Node B 1030 or agroup of devices associated with Node B 1030.

As an example, a device at Node B 1030 may request an encryption key fora communication, and a device at Node A 1020 may supply the encryptionkey. However, in order for the key to be used, the encryption appliedkey management system 200 may first evaluate the key for acceptability(i.e., perform an applied key management job) against the policiesassociated with Node B 1030. Accordingly, if each of the one or more keyattributes associated with the encryption key generated by the deviceassociated with Node A 1020 passes the policies of Node B 1030, then theencryption applied key management system 200 may authorize the generatedkey for use with respect to the requesting device associated with Node B1030.

In some embodiments, the defined policy hierarchy 1000 allows for othernodal applied key management functions, such as, but not limited to, apolicy-based inspection of registered devices as the devices areregistered to a specific node within the policy hierarchy 1000.Accordingly, this type of nodal-based policy inspection may result infewer policy violations associated with non-compliant devices thatconsume applied key management services.

In some embodiments, clients may refer to devices that consume appliedkey management services provided by the applied key management device110. For example, the clients may refer to one or more devices such as,but not limited to, the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b,cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N250 n, and/or the like. Users may refer to consumers of key managementinterface 240 and/or the management user interface 220. For example, theusers may refer to the key generation and management device 230.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may be defined and/or evaluated ona basis of a policy hierarchy (e.g., the policy hierarchy 1000). Forexample, each node (e.g., the nodes 1010-1040) may have a set ofpolicies 115 associated with any device designated for that node

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may be defined and/or evaluated ona basis of clients. For example, each client may be associated with aparticular set of policies 115 for that client. Illustrating with anon-limiting example, an encryption key for the cellular device 250 amay be defined and/or evaluated based on at least a first set ofpolicies associated for the cellular device 250 a while an encryptionkey for the network device 250 b may be defined and/or evaluated basedon a second set of policies associated with the network device 250 b.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may be defined and/or evaluated ona basis of users. For example, each user may be associated with aparticular set of policies 115 for clients administrated by the user.Illustrating with a non-limiting example, an encryption key for a deviceadministrated by the key generation and management device 230 may bedefined and/or evaluated based on a first set of policies associatedwith the key generation and management device 230 while another deviceadministrated by another user (such as, but not limited to, the keygeneration and management device 230) may be defined and/or evaluatedbased on a second set of policies associated with the another user.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may be defined and/or evaluatedbased on a combination of one or more of the policy hierarchy, clients,or users. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, with respect to aparticular communication transaction or action of a particular device(e.g., the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, cellular device250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, and/or thelike), an encryption key may be evaluated based on policies consistentwith a sum of policies corresponding to a node associated with thedevice, the policies specific to that device (client), and the policiesassociated with the user administrating encryption keys for the device.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include an EQUAL (or EQ)policy. The EQUAL policy may be concerned with whether a key attributeof an encryption key is equivalent or identical to a policy value.Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the EQUAL policy may evaluatewhether a size (e.g., length) of an encryption key is identical orequivalent to the policy value. Illustrating with another non-limitingexample, the EQUAL policy may evaluate whether a name (or a portionthereof) of an encryption key is identical or equivalent to the policyvalue.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a ONE-OF policy. TheONE-OF policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of anencryption key is a member of a set. Illustrating with a non-limitingexample, the ONE-OF policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryptionkey is one of a set of different sizes. Illustrating with anothernon-limiting example, the ONE-OF policy may evaluate whether a name (ora portion thereof) of an encryption key is one of a set of differentnames.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a MEMBER-OF policy.The MEMBER-OF policy may be concerned with a parentage (with respect tothe nodes) or association (with respect to groups) of a key attribute160 of an encryption key. The key attribute 160 associated with theMEMBER-OF policy may be a client or user from which the encryption keyis requested or generated. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, theMEMBER-OF policy may evaluate whether a given client or user isassociated with a node or group based on a policy value. The policyvalue may indicate a name, tag, or another type of identifierrepresenting the node or group. In some embodiments, a given client oruser may be associated with a node or group for the purposes of theMEMBER-OF policy if the client or user directly belongs to the node orgroup. In additional or alternative embodiments, a given client or usermay be associated with a node (e.g., Node A 1020) for the purposes ofthe MEMBER-OF policy if the client or user belongs to a child node(e.g., Node B 1030) or parent node (e.g., the root node 1010) of thatnode (e.g., Node A 1020). In additional or alternative embodiments, agiven client or user may be associated with a group (e.g., Group B 1120)for the purposes of the MEMBER-OF policy if the client or user belongsto a group (e.g., Group A 1110) that is included in that group (e.g.,Group B 1120).

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a NULL policy. TheNULL policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of anencryption key is set to NULL. Illustrating with a non-limiting example,the NULL policy may evaluate whether a date (e.g., date created, datedeleted, date modified, date approved, date relocated, and/or the like)associated with an encryption key is set to NULL, as compared to anothervalue. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the NULL policymay evaluate whether a name of an encryption key is set to NULL, ascompared to another value.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a NOT-NULL policy. TheNOT-NULL policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of anencryption key is set to a non-NULL value. Illustrating with anon-limiting example, the NOT-NULL policy may evaluate whether a date(e.g., date created, date deleted, date modified, date approved, daterelocated, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key is set toa non-NULL value, as compared to NULL. Illustrating with anothernon-limiting example, the NOT-NULL policy may evaluate whether a name ofan encryption key is set to a non-NULL value, as compared to NULL.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a GREATER-THAN policy.The GREATER-THAN policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute ofan encryption key is greater than a policy value. Illustrating with anon-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN policy may evaluate whether asize of an encryption key is greater than a policy value. Illustratingwith another non-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN policy may evaluatewhether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portionthereof) of an encryption key is greater than a policy value.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include aGREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy. The GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy maybe concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key isgreater than or equal to a policy value. Illustrating with anon-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluatewhether a size of an encryption key is greater than or equal to a policyvalue. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, theGREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether an ASCII value or anumber of characters of a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryptionkey is greater than or equal to a policy value.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include a LESS-THAN policy.The LESS-THAN policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of anencryption key is less than a policy value. Illustrating with anon-limiting example, the LESS-THAN policy may evaluate whether a sizeof an encryption key is less than a policy value. Illustrating withanother non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN policy may evaluate whetheran ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portionthereof) of an encryption key is less than a policy value.

In some embodiments, the policies 115 may include aLESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy. The LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may beconcerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is less thanor equal to a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example,the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether a size of anencryption key is less than or equal to a policy value. Illustratingwith another non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy mayevaluate whether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (ora portion thereof) of an encryption key is less than or equal to apolicy value.

FIG. 11 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of organizinga policy hierarchy process according to various embodiments.

Referring to FIGS. 1-11 , the process 1100 may be for organizing devicesin a policy hierarchy, such as policy hierarchy 1000. At step B1110, themethod 1100 may include creating a first node. The first node may be aroot node (e.g., Root Node 1010) or may be another node downstream fromthe root node (e.g., Node A 1020 or Node B 1030). The first node may becreated by an administrator of the encryption applied key managementsystem 200.

At step B1120, the method 1100 may include assigning a first policy tothe first node. The assigning may be performed by an administrator ofthe encryption applied key management system 200. The first policy maybe one of the complex policies described above. The assigning may befacilitated by referencing a unique identifier of the first node or ofthe first policy to associate the first node and the first policy witheach other.

At step B1130, the method 1100 may include creating a second node. Thesecond node may be a child node of the first node such that the secondnode inherits the first policy associated with the first node. The firstand second nodes may be stored as a data structure (e.g., a data table)in a database in the encryption applied key management system 200. Thesecond node may refer to a unique identifier associated with the firstnode to indicate that the second node is a child node of the first nodeand the first node is a parent node of the second node.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 may include assigning a secondpolicy to the second node such that the second node is assigned thefirst policy and the second policy. In some embodiments, the second nodemay be assigned additional policies to those inherited from the firstnode. Accordingly, a child node of the second node may inherit thepolicies inherited by the second node and the policies added to thesecond node thereafter. The assigning may be performed by anadministrator of the encryption applied key management system 200. Thesecond policy may be one of the complex policies described above. Theassigning may be facilitated by referencing a unique identifier of thesecond node or of the second policy to associate the second node and thesecond policy with each other.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 may include creating a third node.The third node may reference the second node as a parent node such thatthe third node inherits the first policy and the second policy of thesecond node. The third node may be a child node of the second node suchthat the third node inherits the policies associated with the secondnode. The third node may be stored as a data structure (e.g., a datatable) in a database in the encryption applied key management system200. The third node may refer to a unique identifier associated with thesecond node to indicate that the third node is a child node of thesecond node and the second node is a parent node of the third node.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 further includes registering afirst device to the first node such that the first device is bound bythe first policy of the first node, and registering a second device tothe second node such that the second device is bound by the first andsecond policies of the second node. Each device of an enterprise may beassociated with a node of the policy hierarchy 1000. Registering of thefirst and second devices may include referencing an identifier of thefirst node. Data corresponding to the registration of the devices (e.g.,the referencing data and unique identifiers associated with devices) maybe stored in a database in the encryption applied key management system200. The first device and/or the second device may be a source device150 a or a target device 150 b. The first device may be visible to thesecond device because the first device is at a higher level in thepolicy hierarchy 1000 than the second device is.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 may further include performing anapplied key management operation on the second device registered to thesecond node such that the applied key management operation is evaluatedbased on the first and second policies of the second node. The appliedkey management operation may include one of key management, keydistribution, or key federation. For example, the applied key managementoperation may evaluate a key generated for the second device, and mayevaluate that key against the policies associated with the second node,since the second device is assigned to the second node.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 may further include receiving anencryption key having a key attribute from the first device. The method1100 may further include determining acceptability of the encryption keybased on the key attribute and the first and second policies of thesecond device associated with the second device. The method 1100 mayfurther include, in response to determining that the encryption key isacceptable, distributing the encryption key to the second device. Assuch, the applied key management operation can be said to be performedagainst the second node, to which the second device is assigned.

In some embodiments, the method 1100 may further include creating athird policy, and assigning the third policy to the second node suchthat the second node is assigned the first policy, the second policy,and the third policy. A user at the encryption applied key managementsystem 200 may update the second node to include the third policy.Accordingly, in some embodiments, the method 1100 may further includeupdating the second device to be bound by the first, second, and thirdpolicies of the second node, as the second device may be updatedconsistent with the policy update of the assigned second node.

The embodiments described with respect to the figures relate toencryptions keys. It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skills inthe art that, in other embodiments, the systems and methods directed tothe applied key management device 110 involving management,distribution, and federation may be likewise implemented for othersensitive objects such as, but not limited to, user identityinformation, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data,determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random numbergenerator data, user authentication information, policy components,other components associated with organization security component, and/orthe like.

Various embodiments described above with reference to the figuresinclude the performance of various processes or tasks. In variousembodiments, such processes or tasks may be performed through theexecution of computer code read from computer-readable storage media.For example, in various embodiments, one or more computer-readablestorage mediums store one or more computer programs that, when executedby a processor cause the processor to perform processes or tasks asdescribed with respect to the processor in the above embodiments. Also,in various embodiments, one or more computer-readable storage mediumsstore one or more computer programs that, when executed by a device,cause the computer to perform processes or tasks as described withrespect to the devices mentioned in the above embodiments. In variousembodiments, one or more computer-readable storage mediums store one ormore computer programs that, when executed by a database, cause thedatabase to perform processes or tasks as described with respect to thedatabase in the above embodiments.

Thus, embodiments include program products comprising computer-readableor machine-readable media for carrying or having computer or machineexecutable instructions or data structures stored thereon. Suchcomputer-readable storage media can be any available media that can beaccessed, for example, by a general purpose or special purpose computeror other machine with a processor. By way of example, suchcomputer-readable storage media can comprise semiconductor memory, flashmemory, hard disks, optical disks such as compact disks (CDs) or digitalversatile disks (DVDs), magnetic storage, random access memory (RAM),read only memory (ROM), and/or the like. Combinations of those types ofmemory are also included within the scope of computer-readable storagemedia. Computer-executable program code may comprise, for example,instructions and data which cause a computer or processing machine toperform certain functions, calculations, actions, or the like.

The embodiments disclosed herein are to be considered in all respects asillustrative, and not restrictive. The present disclosure is in no waylimited to the embodiments described above. Various modifications andchanges may be made to the embodiments without departing from the spiritand scope of the disclosure. Various modifications and changes that comewithin the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are intendedto be within the scope of the disclosure.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: receiving, by a system, asecurity object configured to encrypt or decrypt data; determining, bythe system based on at least one policy configured for evaluatingwhether one or more attributes of the security object are secure, thatthe security object is secure to be used by a device, wherein the atleast one policy comprises at least one of at least one first policy ofa first node or at least one second policy of a second node, wherein thefirst node and the second node are parts of a hierarchical structure ofpolicies, the one or more attributes comprises at least one of a lengthof the security object or a time at which the security object iscreated; and authorizing, by the system, the device to use the securityobject to encrypt or decrypt data.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein theat least one first policy comprises a policy used to evaluate the lengthof the security object; and the at least one second policy a policy usedto evaluate the time at which the security object is created.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the one or more attributes of the securityobject comprises a cryptographic algorithm of the security object. 4.The method of claim 1, wherein the system receives the security objectresponsive to the security object being requested by the device forcommunicating the data.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the securityobject is receive from one of a hardware security module, a keymanagement device, or an security object source.
 6. The method of claim1, wherein the at least one first policy comprises one or more policiesdifferent from one or more policies of the at least one second policy.7. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one policy comprises theat least one first policy and the at least one second policy; and thedevice is registered to the first node.
 8. The method of claim 7, thesecond node is a parent node of the first node, and the at least onesecond policy is inherited by the first node from the second node. 9.The method of claim 1, wherein the hierarchical structure is a DirectedAcyclic Graph having a plurality of nodes; and the plurality of nodescomprises the first node and the second node.
 10. The method of claim 1,wherein authorizing the device to use the security object comprisesdistributing the security object to the device in response todetermining that the security object is secure to be used by the firstdevice.
 11. A system, comprising: a memory; and a processor coupled tothe memory, wherein the processor is configured to: receive a securityobject configured to encrypt or decrypt data; determine, based on atleast one policy configured for evaluating whether one or moreattributes of the security object are secure, that the security objectis secure to be used by a device, wherein the at least one policycomprises at least one of at least one first policy of a first node orat least one second policy of a second node, wherein the first node andthe second node are parts of a hierarchical structure of policies, theone or more attributes comprises at least one of a length of thesecurity object or a time at which the security object is created; andauthorize the device to use the security object to encrypt or decryptdata.
 12. The system of claim 11, wherein the at least one first policycomprises a policy used to evaluate the length of the security object;and the at least one second policy a policy used to evaluate the time atwhich the security object is created.
 13. The system of claim 11,wherein the one or more attributes of the security object comprises acryptographic algorithm of the security object.
 14. The system of claim11, wherein the processor receives the security object responsive to thesecurity object being requested by the device for communicating thedata.
 15. The system of claim 11, wherein the security object is receivefrom one of a hardware security module, a key management device, or ansecurity object source.
 16. The system of claim 11, wherein the at leastone first policy comprises one or more policies different from one ormore policies of the at least one second policy.
 17. The method of claim1, wherein the at least one policy comprises the at least one firstpolicy and the at least one second policy; and the device is registeredto the first node.
 18. The system of claim 17, the second node is aparent node of the first node, and the at least one second policy isinherited by the first node from the second node.
 19. The system ofclaim 11, wherein authorizing the device to use the security objectcomprises distributing the security object to the device in response todetermining that the security object is secure to be used by the firstdevice.
 20. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprisingcomputer-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes aprocessor to: receive a security object configured to encrypt or decryptdata; determine, based on at least one policy configured for evaluatingwhether one or more attributes of the security object are secure, thatthe security object is secure to be used by a device, wherein the atleast one policy comprises at least one of at least one first policy ofa first node or at least one second policy of a second node, wherein thefirst node and the second node are parts of a hierarchical structure ofpolicies, the one or more attributes comprises at least one of a lengthof the security object or a time at which the security object iscreated; and authorize the device to use the security object to encryptor decrypt data.